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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Antitrust Law-IMMUNITY-ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTIVITIES RE-
QUIRED OF STATE-REGULATED PUBLIC UTILITY NOT IMMUNE FROM
ANTITRUST ATTACK
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976)
Lawrence Cantor sold lightbulbs; the Detroit Edison Com-
pany, a state-regulated public utility, gave them away.' Cantor sued
Detroit Edison, alleging that the company's practice of distributing
free lightbulbs to many of its residential customers2 was an attempt
to monopolize the retail lightbulb market in violation of section 2
of the Sherman Act 3 and section 3 of the Clayton Act.4 Detroit
Edison moved for summary judgment, claiming antitrust immunity
on the ground that the distribution program was part of an ap-
proved rate structure which the company was obligated to maintain
under Michigan law.' The motion was granted and affirmed on
appeal. 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,7 and, in a plurality
opinion, 8 reversed and remanded, holding that Detroit Edison was
not immune from the federal antitrust laws.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 9 is the Supreme Court's most recent
exploration of a recurring problem: When does state regulation
provide a regulated industry with antitrust immunity?"1 The sev-
eral opinions illustrate the conflict within the judiciary over the
optimal reconciliation of two fundamentally different systems of
'Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110, 3113 (1976).
2 Detroit Edison was responsible for almost 50% of the standard size lightbulbs distrib-
uted in the relevant market. Id. at 3113. If fluorescent and high-intensity lighting were
added to the market, Detroit Edison's share of the market dropped to about 23%. Id. at
3113 n.4.
3 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
4Id. § 14 (1970).
,96 S. Ct. at 3112-13. Detroit Edison's rates, including the omission of a separate
charge for lightbulbs, could not be changed without the approval of the Michigan Public
Service Commission. Id. at 3113.
6 392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd mem., 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
7 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
' Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Stevens
comprised the plurality. 96 S. Ct. at 3112. Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice
Blackmun filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at 3123 (concurring opinion, Burger,
C.J.); id. at 3124 (concurring opinion, Blackmun, J.). Mr. Justice Stewart was joined in
dissent by Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 3128.
9 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
" See Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown,
69 Nw. U. L. REv. 71, 73-74 nn. 12 & 13 (1974).
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economic control: 1 state-sponsored anticompetitive regulation1 2
and federal pro-competitive antitrust laws. 13 Cantor's importance
"i Competition and state regulation conflict not only in their theoretical foundations,
but in their effects as well. See Beil, Power for the People: Electricity and the Regulatory Agencies,
in THE MONOPOLY MAKERS 193 (M. Green ed. 1973); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 191-93 (1971); Averch & Johnson, Behavior of
the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Baker, Competition and
Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 163 n.15 (1975). The
anticompetitive business practices of public utilities have been investigated by Congress. See
Promotional Practices by Public Utilities and Their Impact Upon Small Business: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Activities of Regulatory Agencies of the House Select Comm. on Small Business,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
12 Scientific and legal studies have considered the advisability and impact of state regu-
lation. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-66 (1972). The justification for
state regulation varies with the regulated industry or trade. In the case of natural
monopolies, regulation is often justified on the ground that competition would be impossi-
ble. Destructively competitive industries are thought to require regulation because competi-
tion would be unworkable.
A natural monopoly arises when one efficient firm can satisfy or exceed market de-
mand at the competitive price and increase its capacity at lower cost than any new entrant.
A typical example of a natural monopoly is an electric utility. A destructively-competitive
industry is characterized by low barriers to entry, chronically excess capacity, and inade-
quate access to information which results in frequent price-cutting to levels below marginal
cost. A typical destructively-competitive industry is interstate motor carriage. See C. KAYSEN
& D. TURNER, supra note 11, at 189-200.
"Regulation" takes many forms and varies in scope and impact from state to state and
industry to industry. For instance, licensing attorneys, doctors, barbers, and taxicabs consti-
tutes a form of regulation. Within a particular industry, regulation may prohibit certain
practices outright, as well as affect entrance, pricing policies, capital expenditures, rate of
return, output, allocation of markets, health and safety standards, and exit. For an over-
view and evaluation of regulation of electric utilities, see Note, Regulation, Competition and
Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 785, 793-804. On the authority of the sev-
eral federal and state systems to regulate the generation and transmission of electric power,
see FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND
REGULATION OF ELECTRIC, GAS, AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES (1973). See also FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION, PROMOTIONAL PRACTICES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: A SURVEY OF RECENT ACTIONS
BY STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1970) (report to the Subcomm. on Regula-
tory Agencies, Select Comm. on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives).
Recently, elected officials and appointed policy-makers have called for a broader ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to regulated firms. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1974, at 24, col. 2
(President Ford); REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws 282-93 (1955); Address by James T. Halverson, Director, Federal
Trade Commission Bureau of Competition, to Harvard Business School Club of Houston
(Nov. 8, 1974), reported in [1974] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 688, at E-1;
Statement of Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning for the U.S. Justice Department
Antitrust Division, reported in [1973] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 631, at
A-15. See also Donnem, Federal Antitrust Laws Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 950 (1970).
13 The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
[.. T]he unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best alloca-
tion of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment con-
ducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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lies in its approval of stricter federal scrutiny of the business prac-
tices of firms regulated by state-created commissions.' 4
I
HISTORY OF THE "STATE-ACTION" IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The power of the federal courts and of Congress to override
state regulatory schemes is rooted in the commerce clause.' 5 Com-
mercial activity not affecting interstate commerce is beyond the
reach of Congress, and therefore beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act.1 6 However, if state regulation of activity that is within the
ambit of the commerce clause unreasonably burdens interstate
commerce, the state legislation may be invalidated without refer-
ence to the Sherman Act.1 7 Even if state regulation does not un-
reasonably burden interstate commerce, the state scheme may be
preempted by federal legislation. To the extent that a state law's
operation is inconsistent with federal legislation, it is invalid under
the supremacy clause.' 8
Courts have held that valid and affirmative state involvement
in the challenged activity precludes federal antitrust liability. 19
14 See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418, 422-24 (5th Cir.
1976), citing Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976) (challenged telephone
company conduct held not conduct of acquiescing state agencies or officials).
15 "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743-46 (1976); Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 783-85 (1975); United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1947).
"'See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (state monopoly granted prior to Sherman Act found undue
burden on interstate commerce).
18 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 133-52 (1963); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
384 (1951); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
"
9 See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (state
immune from counterclaim alleging it had fostered restraint of trade); Padgett v. Louisville
& Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974) (local airport board granted
immunity as a "quasi-governmental" agency); Business Aides, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Po-
tomac Tel. Co., 480 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1973) (telephone company acting within scope of
its tariff); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (electric company rates regulated by state commission); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) (electric com-
pany rates regulated by state commission); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency,
433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970) (transportation monopoly created by legislative acts of two
states); Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Elec. Coop., 394 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1000 (1968) (rural electric cooperative); E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Mas-
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Overtly, the rationale for this conclusion sprang from a judicial
interpretation of congressional intent.23 Tacitly, however, the
eleventh amendment 2I and judicial notions of sovereign immunity
carried forward from the English common law colored the analy-
sis. 2 2 The line between liability and immunity remained obscure; 23
Cantor clarified it by increasing the antitrust exposure of state-regu-
lated firms.
Cantor is a product of two distinct lines of antitrust cases. The
first line, beginning with Olsen v. Smith24 and Parker v. Brown,25
sachusetts Port Auth., 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) (port author-
ity granting exclusive lease); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 930 (1966) (private bureau setting insurance rates subject to commissioner of
insurance held "state action"); Continental Bus Systems, Inc. v. Dallas, 386 F. Supp. 359
(N.D. Tex. 1974) (action of two cities in granting exclusive airport transportation fran-
chise); Trans World Assocs., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, [1974] TRADE GAS. (CCH)
75,293 (D. Colo. 1974) (action of city and county in granting exclusive auto rental fran-
chise); Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (exclusive lease
of city coliseum for wrestling matches to private corporation); Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140
F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd mem., 353 U.S. 919 (1957) (Maryland Medical Practice
Act regulating entry into naturopathy field); North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty
Reciprocal Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Ark. 1949), aff'd mem., 340 U.S. 823 (1950) (insur-
ance rates fixed by state commission).
20 "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which sug-
gests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
21 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.
22 C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 67-74 (1972).
23 Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930
(1966) (private bureau setting insurance rates subject to approval of state commissioner of
insurance "state action"), with Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502,
508-10 (4th Cir. 1959) (private board authorized by statute to allocate selling time not
"state action").
24 195 U.S. 332 (1904). Olsen, decided in 1904 and relied upon by the Court in Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (discussed in note 25 infra), was a suit brought by licensed
pilots of the port of Galveston, Texas, to recover damages from a nonlicensed pilot for
providing unauthorized services and to enjoin further offerings. The defendant raised sev-
eral defenses, among them that the state's grant of a monopoly to licensed pilots was re-
pugnant to the Sherman Act. The Court summarily rejected this argument, declaring it
a denial of the authority of the State to regulate, since if the State has the power
to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and commission, those who are to perform
pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal sense
can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are alone
allowed to perform the duties devolving upon them by law.
195 U.S. at 345.
25 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Court rejected an attempt by an irate farmer to
enjoin the enforcement of a California agricultural proration program limiting the quantity
of raisins brought to market. The suit challenged the program on the ground that it vio-
lated the Sherman Act, that it conflicted with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
(Act of June 3, 1937, c. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (Supp.
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dealt with anticompetitive activities undertaken by states or their
agents in accordance with express legislative command. The Su-
preme Court construed the Sherman Act, and held these activities
immune from the operation of the federal antitrust statutes. The
Olsen-Parker cases held that Congress did not intend the Sherman
or Clayton Acts to reach the conduct of the states or their agents.
The second line of cases, anchored by Northern Securities, Co. v.
United States26 and Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,2
analyzed state legislation from a preemption standpoint.2 8 These
cases emphasized the limits of state authority to exempt private
citizens from Sherman Act sanctions by enacting regulatory
legislation; 29 states could not legislatively compel or sanction ac-
V 1975))), and unduly burdened interstate commerce. 317 U.S. at 348-49. Because the
Sherman Act holding was a small part of the Court's opinion (317 U.S. 341, 350-52), many
commentators have expressed surprise that it expanded into the "'Parker doctrine." See, e.g.,
Slater, supra note 10, at 86-87.
26 193 U.S. 197 (1904). The Court allowed the Attorney General of the United States
to sue a holding company organized under the laws of New Jersey in order to enjoin it
from restraining trade. The Court held that no state could prevent Congress from exercis-
ing its authority over interstate commerce through the Sherman Act merely by creating a
corporation. Id. at 332-33.
27 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Schwegmann Bros. involved the validity of a Louisiana retail
price maintenance statute, which made minimum price agreements binding against non-
signatories if they had knowledge of the agreements. Distributors of gin and whiskey in
Louisiana brought suit to enjoin a nonsigning retailer from selling the products at less than
the price fixed by their contracts with other Louisiana retailers. The Court held that the
Miller-Tydings Amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act (Act of Aug. 17, 1937, c. 690, tit.
viii, 50 Stat. 693) (repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145,
89 Stat. 801)), which exempted voluntary retail price maintenance programs from Sher-
man Act liability, did not authorize such a statute. Id. at 395. Without the protection of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment the statute was held invalid as repugnant to the Sherman
Act. 341 U.S. 384, 387-88 (1951).
28 Preemption analysis first considers whether the relevant federal and state laws are
operating in the same field. The court then determines whether Congress intended the
federal law or policy to exclusively regulate the field. If federal law or policy is not exclusive,
the court must determine whether the state law undermines the achievement of federal
goals. Reconciliation rather than ouster of state law is preferred. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). But if federal law is intended to be
exclusive within a particular field, or if the state policy is an obstacle to effectuating federal
policy, the state law is overturned. See, e.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964)
(Civil Rights Act of 1964 prevails over conflicting state laws); Florida Lime & Avocado'
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
not exclusive in its field); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (United
States Warehouse Act exclusive in its field); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
U.S. 440 (1960) (Smoke Abatement Code of City of Detroit not an undue burden on inter-
state commerce). See also Note, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164
(1975).
2I "Fixing minimum prices, like other types of price fixing, is illegal per se.... The fact
that a state authorizes the price fixing does not, of course, give immunity to the scheme,
absent approval by Congress." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
386 (1951) (citations omitted).
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tions that the Sherman Act forbade. 31
Antitrust exposure therefore turned on whether the chal-
lenged activity entailed so much state involvement that it became
"state action" immune from antitrust attack.31 Courts struggled
with cases falling between the Parker-Schwegmann poles. Some ex-
panded state action immunity to embrace nearly every anticompet-
itive scheme where some link could be found tying the actor or the
activity to the state.3 2 Others found the effects of a liberal applica-
tion of immunity unsuitable, and became inventive in side-stepping
the Parker doctrine.33 Eventually, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,34
the Supreme Court moved towards a restrictive application of im-
munity. There, the Court held that bar association minimum fee
schedules were not immune from antitrust attack. Although not
completely shunning the state-action standard, the Court said:
The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive
activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant
to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting
as sovereign. Here we need not inqure further into the state-
action question because it cannot fairly be said that the State of
31 "[W]hen a state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private
conduct which the Sherman Act forbids." Id. at 389.
31 See note 33 infra.
32 See cases cited in note 19 supra.
33 See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Bldrs, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Bale v. Glasgow
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade,
Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. National Soc'y of Professional
Engineers, 389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975); Azzaro v. Town
of Branford, [1974] TRADE GAS. (CCH) 75,337 (D. Conn. 1974); Fox v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., [1974] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75,335 (S.D. Ind. 1974); United States v. Pacific
Sw. Airlines, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 801 (1973);
International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii
1972), modified, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298
F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969),aff'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
Lower courts have created several distinct exceptions to the Parker doctrine. Regulated
firms that have undertaken activities which have subverted the outcome or mechanisms of
regulation have been denied immunity. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
When courts have found regulation to be nothing more than state-sanctioned self-reg-
ulation, the activity has been held vulnerable to antitrust attack. See Bale v. Glasgow
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade,
Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959). Parker immunity has also been denied when the
challenged activity, although arguably under the regulatory authority of the state, had not
been expressly authorized by the state. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F.
Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973)
See also Slater, supra note 10, at 91-101.
34 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the anticom-
petitive activities of either respondent.3 5
The lower courts swiftly applied Goldfarb to previously troublesome
areas.3 6 In Cantor, however, the Supreme Court chose to "inquire
further."
II
THE Cantor DECISION: CONFRONTING STATE-
REQUIRED ANTICOMPETITVE ACTIVITY
Writing for a plurality, Mr. Justice Stevens distinguished
Parker v. Brown,3 7 where the defendants were California state offi-
cials carrying out a legislative program of the state.3 8 He read
Parker to hold only that anticompetitive actions, taken by state offi-
cials pursuant to express legislative command, did not violate the
Sherman Act; so limited, Parker had no bearing on the antitrust
liability of a state-regulated natural monopolyA9
The plurality recognized, but rejected, two conceivable reasons
for holding conduct required by state law immune from Sherman
Act liability. First, noting that "typically cases of this kind involve a
blend of private and public decisionmaking," 4 Mr. Justice Stevens
brushed aside contentions that it would be unjust to punish an
individual or corporation for obeying state law. The plurality was
unwilling to grant immunity where a party exercises "sufficient"
35 Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
" See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.
1976) (city is not automatically exempt from federal antitrust laws); Duke & Co. v. Foer-
ster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (discrimination against suppliers not compelled by direc-
tion of state as sovereign); Chastain v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C.
1975) (anticompetitive practice of telephone company not compelled by state regulation).
37 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See note 25 supra.
38 The party defendants in the lower court were the California State Director of Ag-
riculture, the members of the State Agriculture Prorate Advisory Commission, the members
of the Program Committee for Prorate Zone No. 1, and others responsible for enforcing the
program. 317 U.S. at 344.
39 96 S. Ct. at 3117. Although this is an extremely narrow interpretation of Parker, it has
been suggested that the Sherman Act, read literally, does not shield a state from suit. 88
HARV. L. REv. 1021, 1021 n.5 (1975). Nevertheless, courts have generally conceded that the
sovereign states are immune from antitrust attack. See, e.g., New Mexico v. American Pet-
rofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974). States may sue as plaintiffs for antitrust violations
on the theory that an opposite ruling would leave states remediless. Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159, 162 (1942). The United States, possessing a remedy in its ability to prosecute anti-
trust violators criminally, may not act as a plaintiff in a treble damage civil antitrust action
(United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 608 (1941)), but may recover its actual dam-
ages in a civil action (15 U.S.C. § 15a (1970)).
For the definition of "natural monopoly," see note 12 supra.
4" 96 S. Ct. at 3118 (footnote omitted).
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freedom of choice in the anticompetitive activity or participates in
the process of regulatory decisionmaking. 41 Second, Mr. justice
Stevens found that Congress did not intend to give state regulatory
agencies more power than federal agencies to exempt private con-
duct from the antitrust laws. A state can immunize private conduct
from antitrust liability only to the minimum extent necessary to
make a state regulatory scheme work.42 Mr. justice Stevens saw no
need to grant an implied exemption for Detroit Edison's lightbulb
program, and found no inconsistency in applying both public in-
terest and competitive standards of behavior to a firm that operates
within two industries, one regulated pervasively by the state, the
other unregulated. 43 Nor was the federal interest to be "inevitably
subordinate" to that of the states when a genuine inconsistency be-
tween the two interests appeared. 44 Thus, neither Michigan's ap-
proval of the lightbulb exchange program, nor the mandatory
nature of that program, formed a sufficient basis for immunity. 45
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring, asserted that Parker
could not be limited to suits against state officials. 46 He urged the
Court to focus upon the relationship between the anticompetitive
activity and the state's authority to regulate.4 7 The Chief justice
would apply the federal antitrust laws when a state regulates a
public utility as a natural monopoly, and "also purports, without
any independent regulatory purpose, to control the utility's ac-
tivities in separate, competitive markets.14 8 He rejected state-action
immunity based on "undifferentiated sanction of . . . ancillary
practice[s], ' 49 and concluded that an exemption for Detroit Edi-
son's program would serve neither federal nor state policy.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 3120. Mr. Justice Stewart criticized this assertion, pointing out that the doctrine
of implied immunity operates only when federal statutes conflict with the antitrust laws. See,
e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-55 (1963). Implicit exemp-
tions arising from state statutes are not only disfavored, but theoretically impossible. Id. at
3135 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.). But see note 100 and accompanying text infra.
42 96 S. Ct. at 3119. See Gulf States Utils. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1972) (antitrust
policy and anticompetitive consequences of action must be considered by FPC); Federal
Maritime Comm. v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968) (FMC cor-
rect in considering antitrust policy in reaching decision); Denver & Rio Grande W.R. Co. v.
United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967) (ICC required to consider anticompetitive consequences
in reaching decision).
44 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
45Id. at 3121.
41 The Chief Justice concurred in the plurality's assertion that Parker was inapposite.
Id. at 3121.47 Id. at 3123. "In interpreting Parker, the Court has heretofore focused on the chal-
lenged activity, not upon the identity of theparties to the suit." Id. (emphasis in original).
48 Id. at 3123-24.
49 Id. at 3124.
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Mr. Justice Blackmun, also concurring, agreed with the plural-
ity that "anticompetitive conduct.., sanctioned, or even required,
by state law [is] not of itself ... conduct beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act." '' The case turned on whether, and to what extent,
Congress intended to preempt state regulation through the Sher-
man Act.51 Mr. Justice Blackmun asserted that the Court's task was
to balance federal and state interests to insure that the federal
interest will prevail when a conflict arises. 52 To this end, he rec-
ommended applying "a rule of reason, taking it as a general prop-
osition that state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must fall like
any other if its potential harms outweigh its benefits."53 Mr. Justice
Blackmun recommended that the Court should be reluctant to find
an unreasonable restraint when the state-sponsored anticompeti-
tive activity is supported by substantial justifications. 54 He con-
cluded that the lightbulb exchange program was not crucial to the
successful operation of the Michigan regulatory scheme, and that
"ending competition in the lightbulb market cannot be accepted as
an adequate state objective without some evidence-of which there
is not the least hint in this record-that such competition is in some
way ineffective." 55
5" Id.
51 "Congress itself has given support to the view that inconsistent state laws are
preempted by the Sherman Act. Were it the case that state statutes held complete sway,
Congress would not have found it necessary in 1937 to pass the Miler-Tydings Amend-
ment . . . to the Sherman Act .... " Id. at 3125 (citations omitted). The Miller-Tydings
Amendment exempted resale price maintenance programs from Sherman Act liability. Re-
cently, Congress amended the Sherman Act to remove resale price maintenance programs
from the list of exempted activities. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)).
52 96 S. Ct. at 3127.
53 Id. at 3126.
54 Id. at 3127 (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 3128. Mr. Justice Blackmun's observation raises some fundamental questions.
To what extent would, or could, the record brought to the Court on a motion for sum-
mary judgment reveal the ineffectiveness of competition in the retail lightbulb industry? A
second related question is whether additional evidence should be marshalled to show the
ineffectiveness of competition when the Court has before it the Michigan regulatory stat-
ute. It is unclear from Cantor whether the fact of legislative regulation constitutes prima
facie evidence of the ineffectiveness of competition, or whether counsel must, in addition,
supply other evidence to support the necessity of regulation. If the fact of state regulation
is not enough, problems arise: might scholarly studies be introduced? Further, in many
states an official legislative history is sparse or nonexistent. Both courts and counsel must
then resort to statutory language and to conjecture to determine whether competition is
"ineffective." Because the language of the regulatory statute may not expressly cover most
challenged activities, defendants may face considerable difficulty in demonstrating that
competition is ineffective. Mr. Justice Blackmun would make such a showing a prerequisite
to reliance on an ambiguous state enactment for immunity from antitrust liability. Id. at
3126-27.
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Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, predicted that the Court's rul-
ing would have dire consequences for public utilities exposed to
massive treble damage lawsuits.56 He disagreed with the Court's
"emasculation" of the Parker doctrine, finding in the legislative his-
tory of the Sherman Act an intent to have the federal law supple-
ment, rather than preempt, existing state legislation controlling
natural monopolies.57 He argued that immunity should be granted
when a state requires anticompetitive conduct.5 8 Mr. Justice
Stewart found two flaws in the plurality's reasoning. First, he con-
tended that predicating antitrust exposure and potential liability on
a firm's participation in the regulatory process was inconsistent
with the Court's decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.5 9 Noerr held that the first amendment al-
" The fear expressed by the dissent may be premature. Although treble damage
awards are not entirely within the discretion of the court (Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp.,
429 F.2d 873, 878 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1970)), courts are precluded from
awarding treble damages when: (1) liability-producing conduct is arguably lawful under the
auspices of other federal legislation (Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S.
213, modified, 383 U.S. 932 (1966)); (2) a firm complies with a state court injunction, even
if its issuance was in error (Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 401
n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968)); (3) the liability-producing conduct is a
result of economic coercion and the defendant has no adequate legal remedy (see Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 245 F. Supp. 889, 894-98 (N.D. Ill.
1965)); (4) the plaintiff was in pari delicto with the defendant (reducing damages to those
incurred while plaintiff was not a participant) (Gaines v. Carrollton Tobacco Bd. of Trade,
Inc., 386 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1967)); and (5) the plaintiff has signed a valid release or dis-
claimer (Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971)). This last de-
fense is limited because a release is inoperative if it embodies, or materially aids, the accom-
plishment of any of the illegal objectives of a conspiracy to restrain trade. Carter v. Twen-
tieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 127 F. Supp. 675, 680-81 (W.D. Mo. 1955). See also Redel's,
Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 98-101 (5th Cir. 1974); S.E. Rondon Co. v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 288 F. Supp. 879 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Further, both the plurality and Mr.
Justice Blackmun would recognize a "domination" or "fairness" defense. 96 S. Ct. at 3119
(plurality); id. at 3128 n.6 (Mr. Justice Blackmun). See notes 64-65 and accompanying text
infra.
57 96 S. Ct. at 3136-38.
8 Id. at 3139.
59 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Noerr was brought by trucking companies and their trade as-
sociation against a number of railroads, a railroad association, and a public relations firm.
The complaint alleged that the defendants had conspired to restrain trade and monopolize
the long-distance freight business through a publicity campaign designed to foster and
maintain laws destructive of the trucking industry. The Court held that no Sherman Act
liability could be predicated on a combination organized to influence legislation:
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation by a cam-
paign of publicity, that an incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction
of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign
is directed. . . . To hold that the knowing infliction of such injury renders the
campaign itself illegal would ... be tantamount to outlawing all such campaigns.
Id. at 143-44. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965),
broadened the doctrine introduced by Noerr. There, the trustees of the UMW sued part-
ners in a coal mining company for royalty payments. The partners cross-claimed, alleging
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lows firms to conspire with one another to urge the passage of
anticompetitive legislation, and that such activity is outside the
sweep of Sherman Act sanctions. Second, Mr. Justice Stewart ar-
gued that determining whether the challenged activity was "cru-
cial" to the success of the regulatory process forced the Court to
make ad hoc judicial determinations of the reasonableness of state
legislation. 61,
III
THE LIMITED REACH OF IMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF Cantor
A plurality opinion necessarily leaves uncertainty in the law,
but a close reading of Cantor indicates a majority consensus on
three issues. First, the Court reaffirmed the Parker doctrine as it
applies to states and state officials acting pursuant to express legis-
lative command. 61 The plurality's emphasis on language in Parker,
that a state must act in its capacity as sovereign to enjoy immuni-
ty,62 indicates that states may face antitrust attack if they engage
in proprietary activities. 63
that the trustees, the UMW, and certain large coal operators had agreed to eradicate over-
production by eliminating smaller companies through the imposition of various uniform
labor standards throughout the industry. The Court held that joint efforts to influence
public officials cannot be the basis of antitrust liability, even where the purpose of such
petitioning is the elimination of competition, or is, itself, part of a scheme violative of the
Sherman Act. 381 U.S. at 670. In Cantor, Mr. Justice Stewart perceived a threat to this
"doctrine" in the attempt to assess the "fairness" of applying antitrust sanctions to a given
actor by measuring his participation in the regulatory process. 96 S. Ct. at 3132. But see
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (antitrust action
predicated on such combinations allowed where no true purpose of influencing legislation
appears). See generally Jacobs, Regulated Motor Carriers and the Antitrust Laws, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 90, 108-13 (1972).
60 The "second arm" of the plurality test is in substance a determination of whether
Congress intended to superimpose antitrust standards on conduct already regulated by the
states. Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent asserted that the factors used by the plurality in arriving
at a determination had little or nothing to do with congressional intent. 96 S. Ct. at 3134. See
Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 328 (1975).
61 96 S. Ct. at 3116 (plurality); id. at 3123 (concurring opinion, Burger, C.J.); id. at 3128
n.5 (concurring opinion, Blackmun, J.).
62 "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature." Id. at 3116 n.21, quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). The
Court did not articulate the degree of legislative direction that is sufficient to enable a
regulated firm to claim immunity. One possible option is a variant to the "alter ego" test,
applicable to state agencies seeking shelter under the state's sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 268 F. Supp. 568 (D.N.J. 1967).
63 96 S. Ct. at 3117 n.24. Cf. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (counties);
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976) (cities); Duke
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Second, even the Justices voting for reversal found "state ac-
tion" relevant in situations where extensive state involvement with
an activity would render application of antitrust sanctions to par-
ticular actors unfair.61 Only one Justice explored the distinction
between fair and unfair application of the antitrust laws; 5 compul-
sion of the variety confronting Detroit Edison obviously did not
justify immunity.66 One question posed by Cantor is the extent to
which this proposed "fairness" defense is limited by a firm's par-
ticipation in the regulatory process.6 7 Most regulated firms partic-
ipate in the regulatory process, 68 and the dissent in Cantor ob-
served that this is advisable. 69 To protect a firm opposing legisla-
& Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (county agencies); Fox v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., [1974] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75,335 (S.D. Ind. 1974) (state agencies). But see
New Mexico v. American Petrofina, Inc., 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974) (state). Another pos-
sible analysis in this context is found in the implicit consent of a state to bear antitrust liabil-
ity. Cf. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (state subjects itself to jurisdiction of
Federal Employer's Liability Act by operating railroad); Department of Transp. v. Amer-
ican Commercial Lines, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (state agency consents to
counterclaim by invoking federal court's jurisdiction).
64 96 S. Ct. at 3119 (plurality); id. at 3128 n.6 (concurring opinion, Blackmun, J.).
65 [A] defense based on fairness would be a defense to a damage recovery but not
injunctive relief. The latter, of course, presents no danger of unfairness .... [T]he
defense rests on the theory, not that the challenged restraint is legal, but that since
the defendant has committed no voluntary act in implementing it, he cannot be said
to have violated any law.
Id. at 3128 n.6 (concurring opinion, Blackmun, J.). Mr. Justice Blackmun also urged applica-
tion of the fairness defense where regulatory "lag" led to the liability of the regulated firm.
Id.
66 Mandatory compliance with an approved commission order serves only to insure that
rate changes affecting consumers are implemented after proper notice and hearing. But
"any alteration or amendment in rates or rate schedules applied for by any public utility
which will result in no increase in the cost of service to its customers may be authorized and
approved without any notice or hearing." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.6a (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 22.13(6a) (Callaghan Supp. 1976)). The Court might well have chosen to question the
"mandatory" nature of the lightbulb exchange program, and reversed the judgment of
lower courts on the ground that mere state approval does not yield antitrust immunity.
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
67 The plurality indicated that the fairness of applying antitrust laws to state regulated
firms would be direcdy proportional to their participation in the regulatory process. 96 S.
Ct. at 3119.
68 See Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8,
9-10 (1940).
69 96 S. Ct. at 3134 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.). The optimal extent of participation
by regulated firms in the regulatory process is far from clear. Critics of regulatory agencies
note that industry participation in regulatory schemes frequently develops into subservience
of the agency to the industry. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION 183-87 (1955); L. KOHLNIEIR, JR., THE REGULATORS 69-82 (1969); WORKING ON
THE SYSTEM-A COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR CITIZEN ACCESS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES 9-12 (J.
Michael ed. 1974). On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of a successful regulatory
scheme operating in an information vacuum with respect to the industry it controls. The
advisability of using a participation test for antitrust exposure thus turns on which percep-
tion of regulatory behavior is accepted by the courts.
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tion or administrative rulings from antitrust liability on "fairness"
grounds, while exposing that same firm to antitrust liability when
it supports legislation or administrative rulings on "participation"
grounds, raises serious questions under Noerr.70 Such a rule
would discourage regulated firms from constructively participating
in the regulatory process. This problem could be somewhat al-
leviated by limiting Noerr to its facts; attempts to influence legisla-
tion would thus be protected from antitrust liability, while attempts
to influence regulatory agency rulings would not. However, such a
distinction contradicts the realities of the regulatory process.
Third, state-sanctioned anticompetitive activities "comparably
imperative" or "crucial" 71 to the operation of an otherwise valid
regulatory scheme remain immune from attack, while the ancillary
activities of a regulated firm are granted no immunity. No Justice
attempted to define "ancillary" or "crucial. " 72 Presumably, courts
should examine the challenged activity against some yardstick of
acceptability. Whether this yardstick is to be the state-enacted reg-
ulatory legislation, administrative decisions or rulings, or judicial
perception of the purposes or reasonableness of state regulation is
left unexplained.
The ambiguities resulting from the Court's failure to construct
tests to determine whether activities are ancillary or crucial to a
regulatory scheme open a number of possible avenues of defense
for public utilities and other regulated firms facing antitrust chal-
lenges. Because one regulatory scheme, to function properly, may
require a wider variety of anticompetitive activity than would a
differing statutory pattern,73 activity crucial to the successful oper-
ation of a state statute controlling natural monopolies may not
be vital to the operation of a scheme regulating destructively-
competitive industries74 or professions. 75 The primary lesson of
Cantor-that "ancillary" practices compelled by state regulatory
bodies are vulnerable to antitrust attack-compels a case-by-case
analysis of the nature of the particular regulated industry. For
7" See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
71 96 S. Ct. at 3120 n.36 (plurality); id. at 3128 (concurring opinion, Blackmun, J.).
72 See text accompanying notes 94-102 infra.
" See note 12 supra. Thus, while rate control is vital to regulatory schemes dealing with
natural monopolies and destructively-competitive industries, it is seen as ancillary to the
regulation of professions. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); text ac-
companying notes 34-35 supra.
74E.g., MICH. Comsp. LAWS §§ 475.1-479.49 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 22.531-.587(109)
(1970 & Callaghan Supp. 1976)) (motor carriers).
For the definition of a "destructively-competitive" industry, see note 12 supra.71E.g., MICH. Co~tp. LAws §§ 600.901-.949 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.901-.949 (Cal-
laghan 1976)) (attorneys).
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example, in determining "ancillary" practices, six Justices agreed
that the status of a public utility as a regulated natural monopoly
did not justify entry into a complementary product group, retail
lightbulb sales. 76 Such a result might not follow where a member
of a destructively-competitive industry enters a complementary
product group with regulatory blessing, or even where natural
monopolies like Detroit Edison enter some complementary product
groups.77
A similar analysis applies when examining how the regulatory
schemes of different states affect a particular industry. A natural
monopoly confronted with an antitrust challenge similar to that
faced by Detroit Edison, but operating under a regulatory statute
broader in scope or language than the Michigan statute, may con-
vince a court that the anticompetitive practice found vulnerable in
Cantor should be given immunity as "crucial" to the operation of
that broader regulatory framework. 78 Conversely, the more nar-
rowly a regulatory statute is drawn or construed, the more likely
a practice will be found "ancillary" to the operation of the regula-
tory scheme and thus open to liability.
Cantor's narrow interpretation of Parker and the limited im-
munity available to a firm when economic regulation does not
directly involve the state place a sizeable burden on a firm con-
fronted with a state regulatory order compelling it to engage in
anticompetitive activity.7 9 The analyses utilized by the plurality-
emphasizing fairness and pragmatism-to restrict "unwarranted
hyperextentions ' '80 of Parker are theoretically unimpeachable.
Nonetheless, they obscure the vital issue of the limits placed on
76 Two products are said to be complementary when an increase in the demand for one
leads to an increase in the demand for the other. See R. POSNER, supra note 12, at 108 n.2.
77 Public utilities engaged in the generation and transmission of electric power may, for
instance, justify entry into other "competitive" markets such as high-tension wiring, levated
power transmission poles, and other products necessarily incident to their primary function.
Safety, efficiency, or the need for standardization provide possible justifications.
78 For a comparison of various state regulatory statutes, see FEDERAL POWER COMMIS-
SION, FEDERAL AND STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION OF ELECTRIC, GAS,
AND TELEPHONE UTILITIES (1973).
79 Prior to Cantor, private firms connected in any way to state regulatory schemes en-
joyed a comparative immunity advantage relative to firms regulated by federal agencies.
Compare Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972), with Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Cantor possibly turns the table, in that antitrust liability is clearly suspended within the
ambit of authority enjoyed by a federal regulatory agency. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 385 (1973); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1963). The suspension of antitrust liability within the
ambit of a state agency's authority is questionable in light of Cantor.
80 International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153,
1203 n.129 (D. Hawaii 1972), modified, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
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state regulatory authority by the federal antitrust laws. They also
fail to meet the larger issue avoided by the Cantor Court: Why
should there be immunity at all?
At common law, immunity emerged from a judicial perception
that "the King can do no wrong."' 81 In England, however, the
sovereign immunity doctrine was never an absolute bar to suit.82
Retention of the doctrine in the United States was based on the
desire of the Framers to create a federal system with "sister
sovereignties"; this led Hamilton to say: "[i]t is inherent in the na-
ture of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent."83 Immunity developed from the understanding
that though the federal courts are the only tribunals sufficiently
impartial to try the states, 84 the practice-except in enumerated
circumstances 8 -could result in disruption of the federal system.
The Framers thus left many matters of immunity to the states
themselves.
The legislative history of the Sherman Act supports the thesis
that it supplements, rather than displaces, existing state regulatory
enactments. 86 The confusion in Cantor results from the Court's
failure to solve the problem of state action by examining the func-
tional roots of immunity. 87 Immunity is rooted in a perception that
the Constitution leaves states free to act within their spheres of
sovereignty. In applying a "rule of reason"8 8 only through the op-
eration of the fairness defense, the plurality left valuable but
merely functional activities of regulated firms open to antitrust
attack. 89 Although the decision may lead to state antitrust liability
in certain circumstances," an equally plausible reading of Cantor
would find the Court's interpretation of Parker an ironclad prohibi-
tion of suits against states. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
:I W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 975 n.48 (4th ed. 1971).
82 This statement was largely an illusion even to the English courts at the time of the
American Revolution. See C. JACOBS, supra note 22, at 5-9.
83 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548 (A. Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961) (em-
phasis in original).
84 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534-36 (A. Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961).
8 Id. at 539-41. Such circumstances include controversies between two or more states,
between a state and citizens of another state, and between two citizens of the same state
claiming lands under grants of different states. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
86 96 S. CL at 3137 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.). See also H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1890); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
87 The state action immunity doctrine derives from the sovereign immunity doctrine.
See note 33 & text accompanying note 31 supra.
8 8 See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).89 See note 67 supra.
80 96 S. Ct. at 3119 (plurality opinion); id. at 3128 n.6 (concurring opinion, Black-
mun, J.).
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Blackmun, espousing a rule of reason in all cases, offers regulated
firms a more extensive range of immunity. 91 But Mr. Justice
Blackmun's reasoning would strike a balance between the federal
interest in fostering competition and state actions that have little
relation to legitimate state interests. 92 The better analysis, sug-
gested but never articulated by the concurring opinion of Mr.
Chief Justice Burger,93 looks to the terms of the state regulatory
statute. Such an analysis is consistent with the federalism basis for
immunity and also provides courts and potential litigants with a
more concrete measure of the extent of antitrust exposure facing
regulated firms.
Thus, when a state's extension of authority into an area of the
economy has an anticompetitive impact, preemption analysis is ap-
propriate for balancing conflicting federal and state interests.94
However, state-regulated activity mandated by a state regulatory
scheme that is not specifically preempted should face antitrust
scrutiny on the same grounds as an order of a federal regulatory
commission. 95 An activity authorized by a regulatory agency should
not receive antitrust immunity when the regulatory agency or
commission lacks the requisite express statutory authority. 96 The
finding of "crucial" or "ancillary" practices springs not from the
Court's determinations of the substantive validity of state legisla-
tion,97 but from the statutory framework itself. Immunity should
arise only when granted by the express terms of a state statute or
an agency regulation enacted within the proper bounds of its del-
91 "Ancillary" practices would be allowed if the harm flowing from a restraint was
outweighed by its benefits. 96 S. Ct. at 3123.
92 See 96 S. CL at 3126-27.
92 96 S. Ct. at 3123-24. The gist of this suggestion is the Chief Justice's perception of
state "neutrality" regarding the lightbulb program, suggesting that affirmative state in-
volvement through specific statutory authorization might change the outcome. Id. at 3124.
9'See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 388-90 (1951). See
also Note, supra note 28.
95 State regulatory orders are open to challenge and review on several grounds: (1) as
so arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of discretion as to contravene the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment (Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 225-26
(1938)); (2) because the evidence upon which the order was based is not substantial enough
to warrant the result (see Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438
F.2d 1286, 1304-07 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972)); and (3) because the
rates set are confiscatory (see Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. FPC, 179 F.2d 179,
187-88 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 957 (1950)).
96 Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943); FPC v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936);
Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc. v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n, 181 Colo. 170, 509 P.2d 804
(1973). Michigan recognizes that the Public Service Commission has limited authority. De-
troit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom, 382 Mich. 673, 172 N.W.2d 382 (1969).
97 96 S. Ct. at 3134 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.).
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egated authority, and not from the nexus between a firm's activi-
ties and "the state." In areas where regulatory agencies clearly pos-
sess express authority, the proper result, based on the principle of
federalism underlying immunity, would be to withhold application
of antitrust sanctions. 98 The reference in the plurality opinion to
implied exemptions 99-a non sequitur from a federal preemption
standpoint' 00-acquires validity in this context because every stat-
ute either prescribes or prohibits a penumbral series of practices
too numerous to specify in the text of the statute, yet essential for
its effective performance. Although courts should not favor im-
plicit immunity, it is available to make the regulatory act work."" I
Federal courts, in passing on the ancillary or comparably impera-
tive nature of certain activities, thus have the latitude to recognize
the functional aspects of state regulatory schemes and have clearer
guidance as to which firms or activities may claim immunity. 1 2
Statutory review of this kind leaves the federal courts in a
position to measure the activities of a regulated firm against fed-
eral competitive standards and the state interest in regulation. This
standard has the further merit of presenting regulated firms with
discernible limits of protection and liability.
CONCLUSION
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. is the Supreme Court's most recent
effort to clarify the law of state-action immunity. Although the
plurality decision leaves some uncertainty, stricter federal scrutiny
of state-sponsored anticompetitive schemes is forthcoming. The
confusion within the Court as to the proper extent of this scrutiny
results from the failure of the Justices to consider the functional
roots of immunity as it relates to state regulation. A potentially
useful analysis would follow the terms of the state regulatory stat-
ute. This would nurture certainty in the law and allow federal
courts the necessary latitude to accommodate state and federal
goals within the broad constraints of preemption.
William F. Murphy II
9 See Foremost Int'l Tours, Inc. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd., 525 F.2d 281, 284-85 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 57 (1976); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931,
939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
19 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
100 Id. at 3135 (dissenting opinion, Stewart, J.).
'o' "Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication . . . are strongly disfavored, and have
only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provi-
sions." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963) (footnotes
omitted).
1
o
2 See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp.
1153, 1202 (D. Hawaii 1972), modified, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
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